If Values Are Unreal, Why Does Everyone Believe In Them?

If, as nihilism asserts, values are nothing more than mental fictions, why do they seem so real and compelling?  For most people, it seems beyond dispute that rape, torture and murder are wrong, plain and simple.  This seems so obvious that one is inclined to say:  "No discussion necessary: Rape, torture and murder are morally wrong and it would be entirely absurd to say otherwise."  At bottom, this is simply an argument from common sense that justifies the reality of moral claims by appealing to salient features of our experience.  This argument can be formalized in many ways, but three are most common:

(1) By appealing to intuitions or feelings that support certain value-based beliefs.  For example:  "I know ‘deep inside’ that murder is wrong because it is upsetting, revolting and in conflict with my feelings at every level" or some such. 

(2) By appealing to the universality of certain value-beliefs in a community or in the world.  For example:  “Everyone thinks that rape is a bad thing, regardless of time and place, so it must be bad.”

(3) By appealing to ‘human nature’ as an authority.  For example:  “It conflicts with human nature to say that torture is not wrong.”

However expressed, the argument from common sense is undoubtedly the most common reason that people reject nihilism and, on that score, it deserves serious consideration.

  In my view, these arguments say nothing about why values are real and rest solely on references to the same psychological foundations that, in my view, make them unreal.  That is, under appropriate rational scrutiny, the common sense argument fails to point out real world basis for the reality of values.  The argument is equivalent to saying: “But I just know there is such a thing as right and wrong!  I just know it deep down!” 

Suppose our intuitions about the reality of values are so fundamental that they could not possibly exist unless values are, in fact, real.  If that were the case, I would grant that the argument from common sense might have some validity.  However, that is not the case, and the remainder of this essay will demonstrate just a few reasons that those intuitions exist and why they are so strong.  And mind you, none of those reasons have anything to do with their being rational, based on fact, or any other valid justification.  In other words, the question at issue here is not whether people happen to be convinced that values are real.  That much is obvious.  The question is whether there are good reasons to be convinced of them, and that is not obvious at all. 

 People find value claims compelling for many reasons, but none of these reasons point to the notion that value claims are real.  The list below is designed to demonstrate this point.

How We Get Fooled Into Believing in Values

1.  We are fooled when the basis for a value claim is simply assumed.  “x is the right thing to do, so you should do it.” Obviously, saying that “x is right” is simply a claim without any justification. To establish that this value claim has force, we need to know why x is the right thing to do. 

2. We are fooled when the justification is just a restatement of the fact that some people hold the belief in question.  “People in this community believe that you should do x and that means that you should do x” or “You ought to do x because, in my opinion, x is something that ought to be done.”  Genuine support for the moral demand is absent in both cases.  The demand is simply based on the fact that a certain person or group of people hold a particular moral belief and says nothing about whether the beliefs are valid.  It is the same as saying: “The earth is flat because everyone thinks it’s flat.” One wants to say: “Yes, I understand that it’s a popular belief, but can you point to a real fact suggesting that the earth is flat?”

3.  We are fooled through appeals to gods or other moral authorities which themselves lack any support by evidence or rationality.  I will grant that, if such an  authority did exist and made these morals known to us, morality might have legitimate support and might, on that basis, turn out to be real and binding.  But let’s face it, every argument in favor of the existence of god has failed, the world can be explained quite handily without any appeal to god, and the prevalence of "evil and suffering" in the world (which supposedly matters to most gods) are just what we would expect in a world with no god around to help out.  In short, supporting the delusion of values with yet another delusion ("god," “the goodness of nature” etc.) is just to double the absurdity of your case.  

4.  We are fooled though hidden circularities in moral reasoning.  In most cases, value claims are justified with reference to the authority of god (“x is wrong because god or my special revelation says so”) while the existence of that same god or revelation is justified with reference to the authority of the same value claims (“god must exist because otherwise we would have no way to support our conviction that x is wrong”).  In other words, we justify our morals with appeal to god and justify god with an appeal to morals, thereby assuming both before proving either one.  Again, there is a tremendous amount of emotional comfort and social compatibility to be gained from these beliefs and this makes it extremely easy for the circularity to persist unnoticed.

5.  People are fooled by appeals to their emotions, especially guilt.  "How would you feel if your brother took your hard earned money?"  This presumes the authority of the golden rule (“Do unto others…”) but gives us nothing in support of that rule.

6.  People are pressured to believe in values because of threats by social groups and institutions.  Most social institutions are founded on moral principles that resonate emotionally with the public and carry some negative repercussion when they are not obeyed. “You must follow vehicle safety laws or you are a bad citizen and an immoral person; besides, you'll also get punished by the authorities."  The organization of society makes it extremely difficult for us to admit that moral rules do not exist in the real world.  Indeed, refusal to defend these rules can put a person at risk of being socially ostracized or even incarcerated as criminal or insane.  So it’s no wonder that we are easily swayed by moral arguments:  Doing so is integral for getting along in life.  Nevertheless, if we peer honestly into the facts of the matter, these arguments are nothing more than social threats (“you don’t belong if you believe that”) and appeals to feelings (“how can you believe something like that!?”), not genuine supports for the values in question. 

7.  We are also fooled into believing in values when they are supported with appeals to yet more values.  For example:  “It is good to help others because that makes me feel happy, and feeling happy is important.”  This quickly becomes a vicious regress, since we have just appealed to another value (happiness) to justify the validity of the original value.  So, like the original value, this supporting value needs to be supported as well.  And if yet another value is cited, that will also need support, and so forth and so on.  With this kind of argument, value claims never gain footing in the real world.

More could be cited, but these factors alone are strong enough to show that the argument from common sense does not have the rational power that it might at first appear to have.  It tells us a great deal about the way societies function and about the role of emotion in belief-formation, but says nothing about whether values are real and binding.  To demonstrate their reality, we need to identify something other than human opinion to justify their validity.  As far as I can tell, nothing of this kind has ever been identified.  But if it ever is, I'll be the first in line to give up nihilism and embrace the world of values.  

That last line may surprise you, but hey, I only claimed to be a nihilist, not a masochist!  I want to find purpose, happiness and fulfillment just as much as anyone else.  The only reason I'm still a nihilist is that my desire for happiness isn't strong enough to trump my loathing for self-delusion.  It must be the philosopher in me, who knows.  Mark Twain once said that "Faith is just believin’ what you know ain’t so."   If adopting delusion is something you're willing and able to do, I heartily recommend you do it.  At least you’ll have better chances for a happy life (Oh the bliss of ignorance!).  Just make sure you don't commit to a life of philosophy or spend too much time thinking about reality or the delusion might collapse right on top of your head and plunge you into an existential crisis from which you may never escape.  

What is Nihilism?

In popular culture, the term "nihilism" is often used to label those who advocate anarchistic political views, deviant behavior, atheism or who otherwise resist accepted social norms.  In this vague and pejorative sense, “nihilism” is roughly synonymous with “anarchist,” “defeatist,” “nonconformist,” “suicidal” and even “mentally disordered.”  Indeed, the term “nihilism,” for many, conjures up an image of a dark, malevolent underworld that seeks the proliferation of death and chaos.  This popular conception has fomented a public suspicion and aversion to nihilism in general, including the philosophical nihilism discussed in this blog. 

The pejorative use of the term will undoubtedly persist until a more serious treatment of the philosophical nihilism appears in the popular media.  To my knowledge, there is no serious defense of the position published for wider audiences, a defense that would undoubtedly cement a more accurate, specific and useful understanding of the term in everyday language.  Of course, one might argue that Nietzsche provided a sound defense of nihilism and may be regarded as its figurehead and greatest defender.  But Nietzsche, like most great philosophers, is seldom read by the masses and, even when he is read, his meaning is often misunderstood and his nihilism obscured and unappreciated.

So, in view of the confusion attending nihilism in popular discourse, I will begin with a more specific definition and general summary as an opener for this blog.  With these preliminaries on the table, future discussions should prove more fruitful and not simply squabbles over different understandings of terms.  This will become particularly valuable when we encounter the more controversial elements of the position. 

To this end, I propose the following as a provisional summary of my own position and a starting point for discussion:

Nihilism is a philosophical position that denies the reality of values, especially moral values.  Values might include moral standards (“it is good to be honest”), claims about intrinsic worth (“the environment is our most valuable resource”), aesthetic judgments (“Mozart was a superior composer”) or any other judgment that includes notions of goodness or ethics (“we should strive to be good citizens by contributing to the political process”).  On this view, values of every kind are, at best, devoid of any legitimate support in the real world and, at worst, delusions that impair objective inquiry.  In short, nihilism is the view that, in reality, nothing matters.

In other words, nothing in the world--no object, event, idea, etc.--has any importance, purpose, goodness or meaning except in the subjective experiences of value-equipped minds.  Good and bad, ugly and beautiful, wonderful and dreadful, and all other value judgments do not exist in the real world.    

For example, consider the following moral principle:  “it is wrong to kill infants.”  Most people assume that this principle is beyond argument and is somehow a self-evident feature of reality.  In other words, like most moral principles, it appears to have intrinsic validity, so that we might say: “the killing of an infant by another human being is a special kind of event that is necessarily wrong in every time and place."  These kinds of moral judgments are so obvious and emotionally resonant that they seem to be hard-wired into the basic structure of the universe, making them impervious to refutation.  Indeed, because of the strong emotions attending these judgments, it seems almost perverse for anyone--nihilists included--to deny their validity. 

But there is no getting around the implications of the nihilist perspective:  If nihilism is true, we cannot rationally maintain that infanticide is a bad thing.  Of course, this is not to say that infanticide is a good thing either.  Good and bad do not really exist.  So in spite of our emotionally charged intuitions to the contrary, infanticides are just events alongside other events, completely devoid of moral content.    

These arguments might seem absurd and repulsive to many readers.  I can imagine a comment arriving in my inbox: “Vern, if you seriously believe that the murder of babies is not morally wrong, you are a twisted, sociopathic monster of a person and, in all likelihood, a threat to public safety.”  I can sympathize with this kind of reaction and, in spite of my philosophical convictions, I have very strong feelings about all kinds of violence.  But my feelings say nothing about the real world and nothing about the reality of value claims.  My feelings only suggest that certain value claims have very deep roots in my psyche.

Nihilism and the Hazards of Truth

Values—especially those related to birth, sex and death—are so deeply entrenched in our mental equipment and supported by such severe social pressure that most people cannot even conceive of doubting their reality.  In fact, such doubt is explicitly prohibited in many societies and the penalties backing these prohibitions can be severe.

This makes nihilism rather unique among philosophies.  Granted, it challenges the most fundamental assumptions governing society and culture, but in reality it is nothing more than a simple philosophical claim that has no practical implications and no ethical imperatives (it rejects both).  Nevertheless, nihilism can expose its outspoken adherents to many risks, from depression and suicide to social persecution and alienation.  In addition, consider how life would change if, in America, religion died off and nihilism became the dominant philosophy.  I cannot imagine a more horrifying vision. 

This furnishes an important lesson about intellectual honesty.  If you consider yourself a “truth seeker,” you will concur when I say that the sole target of honest inquiry should always be truth (i.e., the facts, reality, what is really the case or what have you).  If an unbiased investigation uncovers a fact about the world, we are bound as truth-seekers to at least admit that the truth of this fact.  Regardless of how ugly or unpopular or nauseating the facts may be, the target must not be moved: Truth and truth alone is the goal of honest inquiry.  So if—like most—your ultimate concern in philosophy is to pick out the best candidates for truth when approaching life’s most compelling questions, you cannot allow the social implications or emotional difficulties of nihilism to have any bearing on your analysis of it.  In other words, if what you really want is the truth, you have no choice but to accept or reject the nihilist position on its own rational merits and without any consideration of its potential consequences for your life or for society.  Only in myths and storybooks does truth exist to make us happy.  In the real world, it doesn’t give a damn how we feel about it.

Pardon me while I brandish some values of my own for the sake of persuasion.  In my view, it is naïve and intellectually dishonest to judge the truthfulness any idea with recourse to whether or not it promotes peace, happiness, self-esteem or any other emotionally amenable results.  Indeed, it just might turn out that, in reality, the world is a dark, depressing and terrifying place, and if you eliminate this possibility in advance, you will never be certain whether you’ve got things right and you will lose access to the least trod paths of thought.  Of course, you could always be upfront about your intentions and admit that, if the world turns out to be a dark and hopeless place, you would rather remain ignorant of that truth in the interests of your own happiness.  If that’s your approach, more power to you.  But if you want to claim that you are a philosopher or that truth is your sole concern, be prepared to enter the dark forests as well as the sunny meadows.

I have been speaking of truth as a valuable commodity that is worthy of pursuit.  Obviously, this conflicts with my claim that nothing matters since, if nothing matters, truth doesn’t matter either.  I’ll grant this point.  However, in my own defense, I’ll freely admit that my obsession with truth is entirely without foundations and forces me to adopt false motives to keep it moving.  There is nothing worthwhile about truth.  But there is nothing worthwhile about anything and no purpose in life, so I don’t need a good reason to seek truth.  Frankly, philosophical inquiry is so deeply rooted that I can’t keep away from it. 

With this said, let us return to the problem of child killing.  I have a very simple request to make of those who would deny the nihilist position.  Show me how the killing of a child in itself, as a bare event in the world, includes the raw materials to form and support a full-fledged moral judgment.  It is clear that, no matter how closely you scrutinize the details of a child-killing event, there is nothing about the event or about the structure of the universe that exhibits value judgments.  To repeat:  Infanticide, homicide, earthquake, bombing: These are nothing more than segments in space time that have distinguishable characteristics allowing us to name them.  There is nothing "out there" in the events themselves implying anything about goodness, tragedy, or any other value. 

In other words, values do not exist except as features exhibited in subjective experiences.  No experiences, no values.  Frankly, I’m not convinced that evolutionary biologists have adequately explained the evolutionary circumstances behind the development of values.  I suspect that values have emerged, in part, to organize and strengthen social groups in response to various kinds of threats and competitors.  It is not difficult to see why a group would be advantaged by built-in value systems to organize, assign roles, eliminate socially hazardous behaviors, and convince members to give their lives for the survival of the group.  However, for my purposes I simply want to argue that values have no extra-mental origins, no extra-mental sustenance, and no extra-mental justification.  They are, for lack of a better term, delusions that developed during the course of evolution.  

My argument may also be summarized as follows:

(1) For anything in the world to "exist" or be "real", it must exist in the world and not solely in some aspect of a person's experience that has been added by the mind.  Anything that exists solely in the mind of a perceiver but is believed to exist in the extra-mental objects of their perception (i.e., out in the world), is the object of false belief and therefore a delusion.   

(2)  It is absurd to suppose that values or the raw materials to construct and support values could be excavated from the brute facts of the world without any recourse to emotion, moral intuition and other mental phenomena.  Values have never appeared outside of subjective experience.

(3)  Since values exist only in our heads (in experience, in emotional intuitions, et al), they do not pass the test for being real and, if believed to be real, must be regarded as delusions.

This leaves us with nihilism: Values are unreal and nothing matters.